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The October 2019 exhumation of the mortal remains of the former Spanish dictator 
Francisco Franco had political repercussions that are still being felt across the Iberian Peninsula 
today. One of the main conflicts that this exhumation raised was the tension between 
remembering the authoritarian past and burying it for the sake of consensual politics. This thesis 
takes the Valley of the Fallen case and applies several theories of democratization in order to 
report findings on the state of Iberian democracy as a whole. My research then looks to Portugal 
to contrast the modes of transition to democracy and resulting transitional justice practices, 
which I argue led to a quicker and stronger consolidation of democracy in Portugal than in Spain. 
The varying democratization practices and the resurgence of an authoritarian past in both 
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CHAPTER 1: LAYING THE THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS 
 
Introduction 
The exhumation of Francisco Franco on October 24th, 2019 brought to light a number of 
issues in Spanish democracy that had been set aside when Franco was buried in El Valle de los 
Caídos (The Valley of the Fallen) over four decades ago. It has polarized a country that already 
struggles with cleavages that divide north from south, east from west and particularly the old 
from the young. It began when Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez of the Partido Socialista Obrero 
Español (PSOE) declared that exhuming Franco would be part of his government’s mandate in 
June 2018. This decision was made when Sánchez took power as a continuation of the legacy of 
former Prime Minister José Luis Rodriguez Zapatero, who broke the “pact of silence” about 
Spain’s past once and for all in 2004 when he demanded justice for the victims of Francoism in 
legislative terms as well as in terms of public debate. Therefore, exhuming Franco became the 
last step in “closing wounds from the past” (El País 2018). The process of exhumation itself was 
caught in various legal battles with the Franco family and the Francisco Franco Foundation until 
the country’s Supreme Tribunal finally gave the green light in September of 2019. 
Why is it important to consider the political repercussions of this exhumation? The fact 
that Spanish politics in 2020 are still centered around a man who took power in 1936 suggests 
that the country has come up short in dealing with his legacy, and perhaps also in fully 
consolidating its democracy. The case of the Valley has broken open not only Franco’s 2000 kilo   
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marble tomb, but it has also unearthed a number of judicial and societal arguments that reveal 
multiple cleavages still present in Spain. There are aspects of Franco’s legacy that have not been 
worked through because, instead of doing so, transition era politicians simply chose a “pact of 
forgetting” model, prioritizing the creation of the new government. 
One example of a societal cleavage that developed into a state crisis recently was the 
referendum for independence in Cataluña in 2017. Another challenge for the country is the rise 
of the far-right populist party VOX, which has continued to win more and more popular support 
since breaking into the Andalusian parliament in December 2018 (El País 2018). VOX is the 
first far-right party to be represented in the national parliament since the Franco era: I argue that 
harmful nationalist ideologies have been festering in Spanish society due to absence of 
discussion about and reckoning with the past. These have manifested themselves in support for 
the VOX party at the polls. The connection between Franco’s legacy and the quality of Spain’s 
democracy therefore can be seen through 20th century political beliefs gaining support on the 
fringes of the political spectrum, which I argue harm consolidated democracies. 
The example of the Valley requires an analysis of the politics of the past not only in 
Spain, but in all of Southern Europe. The first country to spark the “Third Wave” of democracy 
was Portugal. Portugal, like its neighbor Spain, experienced one of the longest right-wing 
dictatorships of the twentieth century called the Estado Novo (New State) from 1926 to 1974. 
This archetypical authoritarian regime, led by António de Oliveira Salazar, was brought down in 
the Carnation Revolution on April 25th, 1974 (Linz 2000). However, where the two neighboring 
countries break from their shared socio-political history was during the transition to democracy.  
The two countries took a very different approach to transitional justice. The revolutionary spirit 
and abrupt rupture with the past in Portugal fostered an environment for thousands of bottom up 
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social and political purges in the years directly following the revolution. These purges resulted in 
many powerful removals as well as a complete overhaul in the political system. This 
revolutionary atmosphere did not exist in Spain. I argue in this thesis that the implementation of 
transitional justice measures early on in Portugal eventually created a stronger liberal democracy. 
I use the Portuguese case to show how transitional justice can lead more rapidly to a fully 
consolidated democracy where the legacy of authoritarian rule no longer shapes society as 
strongly as we see in Spain. How are they different? For one, there are no large monuments or 
polemic burial sites to examine in Portugal because most of them were banned or destroyed after 
the fall of Salazar. Salazar’s small, modest grave is relatively inconspicuous and very far from 
the seat of power in the capital of Lisbon. While there have been proposals to create a prominent 
museum about Salazar, it is unlikely ever to be built. Why has Portugal drawn a line under their 
post-World War II dictatorship while Spain is experiencing renewed contestation and discord 
about how to remember and memorialize its brutal dictatorship of the same era? 
I argue in this thesis that the quality of Iberian democracy is shaped today by the quality 
of the Transitional Justice (TJ) that took place at the time of transition. This is because the type 
of TJ mechanisms used — whether it be legal purges, exiles, truth committees, victim 
compensation or reburials — was a direct effect of the nature of regime change and the 
respective institutions that were built in the early years of democracy. The process of regime 
change in Spain and Portugal was very different: In Spain, after Franco’s death, the transition to 
democracy was “elite pacted” and lacked a popular movement. The elites chose to focus on 
democratic coalitions and consolidation rather than revisit divisions from the Spanish Civil War. 
Therefore, they did not implement a single TJ measure until the early 2000s. In Portugal, in 
contrast, there was a dramatic military coup — and the resulting folklore and April 25th 
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celebrations marked a complete rupture with the past. A revolutionary spirit widespread among 
Portuguese citizens led to a grassroots movement demanding that the perpetrators of the crimes 
of the authoritarian regime be brought to justice.  
My research question is therefore twofold: How has the implementation of Transitional 
Justice measures affected the quality of democracy in Portugal from the Carnation Revolution to 
today? And in Spain, how has the lack of TJ measures affected its quality of democracy from the 
death of Francisco Franco to today? The first years of transition were characterized by large-
scale purges of former secret police members and demands for the resignations of elites 
connected to the Salazar regime from positions across the public and private spheres of 
Portuguese society. Thanks to an early implementation of TJ measures in Portugal, this open 
dialogue has made the past largely irrelevant in politics today. But in Spain, the pact of silence 
regarding the wounds from the Civil War and from the Franco dictatorship has forced these 
issues to reappear in public discourse through various ‘irruptions’ decades later (Wilde 1999). 
The rest of this thesis is divided into four chapters. In the following section, I present the 
theories of authoritarian legacies, transitional justice, and the politics of the past in a review of 
the current literature on the topic. Then I zoom in on Transitional Justice and explain the 
methods of how it can be done, through which institutional bodies, and why it is so crucial for 
democratic consolidation. This section lays the foundational base for my argument linking the 
implementation of TJ measures — or not doing so — with the quality of democracy today in 
Spain and Portugal. The purpose of this literature review is therefore to explore the existing 
theory before delving into the country cases and resulting analyses of political discourse. 
In Chapters 2 and 3, I sketch a brief history of the authoritarian regimes in Spain and 
Portugal for historical context to show which authoritarian-era institutions and attitudes have 
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resurfaced today. Then, I outline how both countries transitioned from authoritarian to 
democratic rule. I focus on the Valley of the Fallen as an example of historical memory that 
‘irrupted’ into political discourse due to a lack of effort to work through past divides. Then I 
examine politicians’ reactions to the idea of the Museu Salazar and/or Centro Interpretativo do 
Estado Novo in an attempt to make a comparison between authoritarian legacies in Spain and 
Portugal. In Chapter 4, I analyze the political discourse surrounding both of the monuments 
corresponding to the Transitional Justice framework and respective measures that were 
implemented. I conclude by examining how these discussions affect the Iberian idea of 
‘democracy’ and how this concept plays out in today’s society. Finally, I explain why the TJ 
measures which were implemented in the mid 1970s in Portugal prevented a resurgence in the 
types of nationalist and far-right politics that can be observed in Spain today, and I make a 
statement on what that means for the quality of Iberian democracy. 
Authoritarian Legacies, Politics of the Past and Transitional Justice Theories 
         This section sketches the existing literature on the Southern European wave of 
democratization with a focus on the parallels in the Southern Cone. I focus on the Spanish and 
Portuguese cases in order to set up the following chapters in which I compare the political 
discourse surrounding the Valley of the Fallen to the Salazar Museum. I also introduce António 
Costa Pinto’s theoretical framework, which I use to help us understand how the legacy of 
authoritarians can shape domestic politics years later (Pinto and Morlino 2017). I draw on these 
theories of authoritarian legacies, politics of the past and Transitional Justice in order to explain 
the many ways in which the legacies of an authoritarian regime can affect democratic society.  
This goal of this section is to address two sets of questions: first, what do we know about 
how to deal with authoritarian rule based on the current scholarship? What do the scholars say 
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about the ways which work well and the ways that do not work very well? Second, how can the 
legacy of authoritarian rule shape domestic politics even decades later? What do scholars tell us 
about this? The first set of questions is necessary to understand the theoretical basis upon which I 
explore the ties between authoritarian legacies and its effects on the quality of democracy. The 
second set of questions will help the reader to understand how current national crises such as the 
Valley of the Fallen or the rise of the far-right VOX party are related to the absence of a national 
reckoning with the country’s divisive past after the fall of Franco. 
The process of democratization in the Southern European countries started on April 25th 
1974 with the Carnation Revolution in Portugal. This famously non-violent revolution triggered 
the Third Wave of democratization which today is generally considered to include the countries 
who turned away from authoritarian regimes in the 1970s across Southern Europe and in Latin 
America. These countries include Spain, Portugal, Greece, Italy, Brazil, Chile, Argentina and 
Uruguay. Many of these countries’ transitions to democracy were not fully consolidated until the 
1980s, which is when a formal study of this Third Wave began.  
Before moving on, it is pertinent to provide a definition of a fully “consolidated 
democracy.” Many scholars have debated just what are the criteria for a consolidated democracy 
— and many others have wondered whether this term is a useful or failsafe measure at all (Linz 
and Stepan 1996). For the sake of this paper, I use Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan’s definition of 
consolidated democracy presented in their most important work, Problems of Democratic 
Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe 
(1996). According to Linz and Stepan, a democracy is considered consolidated when no political 
actors seek to overthrow it. Democracy has become “the only game in town” (Linz and Stepan 
1996: 15). Consolidation requires the existence of a functional state and presence of five 
 14 
reinforcing arenas: a free civil society, an autonomous political society, the rule of law, a 
bureaucracy, and an economic society in which institutions and regulations mediate the 
relationship between the market and the state. 
Since then, an entire field has emerged that is focused on the democratization of Third 
Wave countries. This movement can also go so far as to include the Eastern European countries 
that democratized after the Iron Curtain fell in 1989. These countries are outside of the scope of 
this thesis, however, and I do not evaluate the Eastern European democratization process further. 
Many researchers in the democratization field tie Latin America to Southern Europe, however, 
because of the shared experiences with military dictatorships. For example, comparisons have 
been made by Omar G. Encarnación between Augusto Pinochet in Chile and Francisco Franco in 
Spain, arguing that Pinochet’s trial in the early 2000s forced Spaniards to confront their 
authoritarian past as well. This shared transatlantic history presented by Morlino and Pinto are 
useful to understand the variety of authoritarians that ruled for the majority of the 20th century. 
In addition, their findings are helpful in that they address TJ efforts and their effects across 
Southern Europe and the Southern Cone. 
Before delving deeper into the post-authoritarian theories, it is important to give an 
overview of what we know about how to deal with authoritarian rule and transitions to 
democracy. By assessing which ways work well and which do not, I lay the theoretical 
foundations for the argument in later sections in an attempt to directly tie authoritarian legacies 
to the quality of democracy. In Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl’s 2002 article 
“Concepts, Assumptions & Hypothesis about Democratization: Reflections on ‘Stretching’ from 
South to East,” the authors address the broad question of what happens when an authoritarian 
regime breaks down. They argue that regime change can go in many different directions and that 
 15 
these paradigm shifts observed in Eastern Europe and routinely compared to Southern Europe or 
the Southern Cone are not necessarily always transitioning ‘to democracy,’ but rather, transitions 
‘from autocracy’ (Schmitter and Karl 2002: 9). Essentially, there is no normative catch-all set of 
structures that explain transitions from authoritarian rule. 
There are however, structural conditions that help explain enduring or “high quality” 
democracies. These conditions include the process of liberalization, the formation or resurrection 
of a civil society, and the convocation of fair elections with an uncertain result (Schmitter and 
Karl 2002). The existence of this conditional framework supports my argument tying legacies to 
the quality of democracy because we can point to a set of conditions that were either established 
or tampered with by the regime change makers. In light of an absence of these conditions, a 
weakly consolidated democracy with the potential for future issues could result. I argue that the 
role that the elites played in the Spanish transition to democracy and the preservation of Franco-
era institutions as part of the democratic state has led to a weak state. This in turn has contributed 
to the rise of the far-right in recent years and nationalist challenges like the Catalan vote for 
independence in August 2018 – as I explain below. 
Now that the transitology aspects have been addressed and presented in order to support 
the framing of my argument, I move on to theories of what causes variation in how polities 
function after regime change. I argue that the most important variation leading to long-term 
effects in the quality of democracy is the implementation of Transitional Justice (TJ) measures, 
although I briefly address the other two theories as well. The edited volume Dealing with the 
Legacy of Authoritarianism: The ‘Politics of the Past’ in Southern European Democracies by 
António Costa Pinto and Leonardo Morlino introduces the critical theories of authoritarian 
legacies, politics of the past and transitional justice into the sphere of democratization and 
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memorialization studies (Pinto and Morlino 2017). This volume’s scope once again spans from 
Southern Europe to the Southern Cone. 
The theories that I pull out from this volume with the support of various authors are the 
following: authoritarian legacies, politics of the past and transitional justice. Though I choose to 
apply the lens of Transitional Justice (TJ) in this thesis, it is important to explain and understand 
the other two as well since they are interrelated in essence and cannot exist without one another. 
The findings presented in this volume support my argument tying authoritarian legacies to the 
quality of modern democracies in Southern Europe today. Additionally, through the exploration 
of different case studies I can examine and compare which ways of dealing with the authoritarian 
past work better than others and why. 
I turn first to the power of authoritarian legacies. Authoritarian legacies encompass all 
behavioral patterns, rules, relationships, social and political situations, and also norms, 
procedures and institutions, either introduced or strengthened by the immediately preceding 
authoritarian regime (Hite and Morlino 2004). They may take the form of latent repressive 
memories activated and manipulated by social and political actors at particular moments and 
they may be supported by specific actors, interests or identities. There are two fundamental types 
of legacies: those that concern the values, institutions, and behaviors introduced by the 
authoritarian regime and those that reinforce, strengthen, or entrench previous values and 
existing institutions by establishing new ones that create or reproduce these subsequent 
behavioral habits.  
A survey presented in this book found that in both Spain and Portugal, partially positive 
attitudes toward the authoritarian past remain present. This is especially persistent in the older 
generations of Iberians who view the regime in a nostalgic way. This is important because it 
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means that legacies can permeate post-authoritarian society in both positive and negative 
manners, and it can therefore be observed that Iberians have more positive attitudes about the 
authoritarian past than their counterparts in Germany, for example. This finding is relevant 
because it shows how a presence of tolerance or nostalgia for the past can shape public opinion 
and perhaps even domestic politics years later. 
         The second theory is called politics of the past. Politics of the past is defined in Pinto and 
Morlino’s edited volume as “an ongoing process in which elites and society under democratic 
rule revise the meaning of the past in terms of what they hope to achieve in the present” through 
a set of different actions (Morlino 168). It is important to recognize that this process mostly 
happens on an elite level. Alexandra Barahona de Brito and Maria Sznajder argue that politics of 
the past consist of policies of truth and justice in transition which are expressed through official 
or public memory. The politics of memory also raise several problems, though. The puzzle 
therefore becomes: to forget or to revive the past? To hide or to unveil the memory of 
authoritarianism and/or resistance? To face or to avoid the authoritarian past? Is it possible to 
choose between confronting the past or forgetting? I seek to find some answers to these problems 
in the final chapter of this thesis. 
However, even after the consolidation of democracy, “the old cleavages of transition do 
not disappear like a miracle, they can reappear at specific junctures” (Pinto 2017: 29). 
Immediately, the Spanish case comes to mind where some scholars argue that the 
overwhelmingly two-party system is simply a continuation of the authoritarian regime’s politics. 
In an interview at the University of Lisbon on January 25th 2020, Costa called these reappearing 
cleavages in Iberia ‘irruptions of memory.’ I explain this term, coined by Alexander Wilde, at the 
end of this chapter. 
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The third theoretical basis I examine is Transitional Justice (TJ). TJ is introduced as 
encapsulating “a whole series of measures taken during the democratization process that go 
beyond the mere criminalization of the authoritarian elite and its collaborators and repressive 
agents, which also involve a wide range of extra-judicial efforts to eradicate the legacy of 
previous repressive rule, such as official historical investigations of the authoritarian record, 
purges, reparations, dissolutions of institutions, truth commissions, and other measures taken 
during a process of transition to democracy” (Cesarini 2009: 498-499). Transitional Justice is at 
the same time a consequence and a part of a process of regime change, and as some scholars 
note, it can be a sort of ‘jumping off point’ required of the broader politics of the past process 
that is inherent to the consolidation of liberal democracies. Barahona de Brito defines TJ as “an 
umbrella term that covers a range of disparate practices (truth commissions, trials, compensation 
policies, amnesties, purges) to address a violent past in a period of regime transition and to 
establish a moral and political break with a repressive non-democratic past” (Barahona de Brito 
1997). This is the definition I use from here on out when I refer to TJ practices.  
Now it is pertinent to mention the TJ measures and various residual legacies instituted in 
Spain and Portugal after the transition from autocracy. There are many domestic and 
international factors which can affect the type and quality of TJ that occurs. The main factor in 
play is the type of democratic transition, which Pinto argues is the most evident predictor in 
explaining the form of TJ in a democratization process. The two types of transitions are pacted 
(for example in Spain where the elites from the authoritarian regime had a say in the outcome of 
transition) and a complete rupture with the old system (for example, in Portugal where intense 
break from the past regime and its structures took place) (Pinto 2017). The historical legacies in 
Spain are a long dictatorship after short and polarized democracy and civil war. The fraught 
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relationship with the past democracy propagated the Franco-era myth that Iberians were ‘unfit’ 
for it and perhaps similar attitudes exist today (Encarnación 2013). In Portugal, the long 
dictatorship is the only observable historical legacy, in which Salazar also utilized this myth of 
unfitness for democratic rule. 
Other factors that shape TJ are authoritarian legacies, broader historical legacies, and 
regional and international conditions (Barahona de Brito 2017: 67). In the following sections, I 
go into further detail on the historical legacies and international conditions — such as accession 
to the European Union and colonial legacy — that influenced the type of transition in both Spain 
and Portugal. In fact, I argue that the legacy of the colonial wars in Africa in the 1970s plays a 
greater role in political discourse today in Portugal than the legacies of the Estado Novo. These 
domestic and international factors, as well as the human rights movement of the late 1970s, show 
us how the legacy of authoritarians can shape politics years later in unthinkable ways at the time. 
I focus on Transitional Justice as my main theoretical framework because it is the most 
concrete and quantifiable. TJ theory lays out specific measures that are easy to analyze across the 
Iberian Peninsula that are designed to show the effects leading to — or not leading to — a 
consolidated democracy. Some of these measures include, but are not limited to: truth 
commissions, historical memory making, memorials, recognition, judicial trials and eventually, 
forgiveness. Obviously, some things such as ‘forgiveness’ are not easily measured. However, the 
process of purges (the removal and expulsion of political officials from power and sometimes 
from the country), trials for the perpetrators of human rights crimes and the eradication of 
authoritarian era monuments are easily observed in both Spain and Portugal. Therefore, TJ 
theory and its various measures have become the basis of my pan-Iberian analysis. 
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One cannot mention Transitional Justice without referencing ‘irruptions’ of memory, a 
concept presented by Alexander Wilde in 1999. He said that TJ is a first step in what becomes a 
series of endless memory cycles interrupted by ‘irruptions.’ This unconventional spelling of 
eruption closely matches the Spanish irrumpir which means to break or burst in, and conveys a 
sense of sudden intrusion. Exhuming Franco’s remains from the Valley of the Fallen became an 
‘irruption’ in Spanish politics in the past decade, for example. This term was first introduced in 
Wilde’s work on the transition to democracy in post-Pinochet Chile. He elaborates: “Irruptions 
of memory are part of a counterpoint of what might be called the expressive dimension of 
transitional politics, conditioning its character as they interrupt the flow of normal bargaining 
over budgets and public policies” (Wilde 1999). For example, the trial of Pinochet summoned 
the country’s divided historical memory surrounding the dictatorship, an effect that reverberated 
across the Atlantic to Spain as well. 
Before continuing with the closing of this chapter, I offer a roadmap of the analytical 
approaches that I take in the chapters to follow. I apply the framework of Barahona de Brito’s TJ 
measures in the Spanish and Portuguese chapters in order to compare both countries’ processes 
towards consolidated democracy. I zoom in on the Valley of the Fallen and the Museu Salazar as 
specific ‘irruptions’ of historical memory that exemplify the cracks in the implementation of TJ 
measures to various extents in the respective cases. Then, I also perform an analysis on political 
speeches and quotes from newspaper articles surrounding both monuments to glean what 
importance these controversies have on modern democracy and how the legacy of these 
monuments has shaped domestic politics. In Spain, I look at politicians such as President of the 
Government Pedro Sánchez (PSOE) as well as PP member Pablo Casado and VOX leader 
Santiago Abascal. I also analyze a quote from Rafael Hernando (PP) as well as former PSOE 
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president José Luís Rodriguez Zapatero. I use sources such as El País, La Sexta, and Twitter. In 
the Portuguese case, I entirely perform a legislative analysis on Portuguese Parliament’s “Voto 
de Condenação no. 876/XIII-4a” presented on September 10th, 2019. The main difference here is 
obviously that the Portuguese case offers a firsthand piece of legislature to examine, whereas the 
Spanish examples come from various secondhand sources. In my conclusion, I compare how the 
two countries’ approach their respective pasts and I present what can be learned from the Iberian 























CHAPTER 2: SPAIN: A PACTED TRANSITION OR WILLFUL AMNESIA? 
 
Introduction 
 In this chapter setting out the Spanish case, I begin with a brief history of the Franco 
regime. I also sketch the transition to democracy, sparked by Franco’s death on November 20th, 
1975. I describe the various transitional justice measures that were or were not introduced in this 
period. Next, I address the Valley of the Fallen and describe what this monument is and why it is 
important in contemporary Spain. Finally, I address Franco’s exhumation in September 2019, 
analyzing the political discourse surrounding the exhumation and explaining what this political 
controversy means in the context of modern Spain. I perform the political discourse analysis 
described above in order to gain a greater understanding on the effects TJ measures had in Spain. 
Transition to Democracy 
The transition to democracy in Spain officially began when the dictator Francisco Franco 
died on November 20, 1975. But in actuality, the democratization process had been underway for 
many years before and began with a regime policy called la apertura (the opening) in the early 
1960s. A bottom-up opposition movement was harboring under the surface leading up to 1975, 
but the trigger that began the democratization process was due to top-down forces. On the 
domestic level, calls for democratization among university students as well as the working class 
began in the 1960s. Although modernization theory cannot directly link economic growth to 
democratization in this case, there was certainly correlation. Spain experienced 6.9% per annum 
economic growth and a rise in GDP from $300 to nearly $3000 from 1960-1974 (Powell 42). 
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The ideas of democracy and democratic institutions were beginning to grow more favorable, 
with a 76 percent approval rate among the population surveyed in 1976 (Aguilar Fernández and 
Humlebaek 2002). In the midst of these pressures, coupled with persistent terrorist violence from 
the Basque separatist group ETA, Franco named King Juan Carlos his successor in 1969. This 
hesitant appointment eventually led to King Juan Carlos becoming head of state in 1975. And 
finally, international forces such as pressures from the European Community with vested 
economic interest also come into play here. We know from the work of many historians and 
social scientists that the transition to democracy was not sparked by protests, but by decisions by 
elite actors in the regime and in its immediate aftermath. 
 
Figure 1: Attitudes towards the Franco regime. Source: Aguilar Fernández & 
Humlebaek (2002) 
 Let us now review the chronology of the Spanish transition to democracy as briefly and 
succinctly as possible. On July 22nd, 1969 Juan Carlos was named successor to Franco. Franco 
died on November 20th, 1975 and Juan Carlos was sworn in as King of Spain two days later. The 
King gave Adolfo Suarez, a former Falangist, the task of initiating reforms. One of the most 
important first steps was to legalize the Spanish Communist Party, otherwise known as the 
opposition. Suarez’s government (from July 1976 to 1981) was responsible for carrying out the 
essential steps in the transition towards democracy. Suarez’s party, the UCD (Union of the 
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Democratic Center) received 34.8% of the votes in the first free Spanish elections (1977); Felipe 
Gonzalez of PSOE received (29.4%) the second largest number of votes; the Communists got 
9% of the vote and the AP (Popular Alliance) received only 8% of the vote. The new bicameral 
legislature voted for a new constitution in October of 1978 (Aguilar Fernández and Humlebaek 
2002: 132).  
Circling back to the spirit of democratic transition, one can observe a willing ignorance 
through the unwritten ‘pact of forgetting’ (pacto de olvido) which dominated the post-Franco 
political mood. The process that took place during the transition years was based on the pre-
existing institutions leftover from the regime, including many Falangist elites who were simply 
reshuffled into new positions. There was no recourse to revolutionary matters, no major political 
dismissals from office, and no attempts to bring secret police agents who had perpetrated 
violence, torture and murder at the behest of the Franco regime to justice (Medina 1995).  
We will see in the next chapter, however, that this all happened in the Portuguese case. In 
terms of the army — which had not really been of service since the Spanish Civil War that ended 
in 1939 — they maintained a neutral position and supported the reforma pactada. Before moving 
forward, it is important to describe the key players in the Spanish Civil War: The Republican 
Army, which was supported by the communists, syndicalists and the left-leaning Spanish Second 
Republic, fought against the right-wing conservative Nationalist Army, led by General Franco 
(Bolloten 2015). Prominent scholars on 20th century Spain, such as Carson Humlebaek, have 
explained how the preferred policy of transition by reform was colored by institutional amnesia 
which only had one goal in mind: consensual democracy. In his article “Party Attitudes towards 
the Authoritarian Past in Spanish Democracy,” Humlebaek argued that each step of the transition 
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was characterized by a respect for the authoritarian system in terms of political structure, 
institutional frameworks and the judicial framework (Humlebaek 2011: 74). 
Franco succeeded in leaving many enduring legacies that still shape the Spain’s polity 
and society, but one that stands out is how it shaped early democratic politicians. Many of the 
decision makers in the transition period (which we will consider for the sake of this thesis being 
from 1975 to 1982 at the dawn of the first exchange of power) were old enough to remember the 
rancor that the Civil War brought up, and so they institutionalized a ‘never again’ policy. Franco 
then proceeded to use the Civil War as a tool for legitimacy during his regime by propagating the 
myth that Spaniards were unfit for democracy and therefore needed an authoritarian ruler. A 
similar attitude can be observed in the Portuguese case: “If [democratic rebirth] fails, and a 
military dictatorship moves in once again, it will lend credence to the almost racist, but among 
many Portuguese and Spaniards alike widely held idea that Iberians are inherently incapable of 
democracy” (Harvey 1978: 8). Both Franco and Salazar, who were not close friends but simply 
geographical allies, cultivated an ‘unfit for democracy’ discourse that made democratic 
consolidation a fraught affair (Humbelaek 2011: 74). This narrative worked to the advantage of 
both dictators during their rule and even afterwards in their legacies. 
Even after Franco’s death, most Spaniards believed in this discourse and were plagued by 
the fear of a repetition of the civil war. The idea of retroactive justice for Franco-era crimes was 
too triggering for many Spaniards because of the imagined threat to the social and political 
stability gained in this tenuous period. “The transition to democracy was therefore based on a 
more or less explicit desire to forget or to silence the problematic parts of the past. Paloma 
Aguilar Fernández termed this common understanding among the political elites ‘a tacit 
agreement not to instrumentalize the past politically’ (Humlebaek 2011: 75). 
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Though this unspoken pact was originally informal, it was eventually translated into three 
legal initiatives concerning amnesty for political crimes, the most important being the Amnesty 
Law of 1977. This law, passed nearly unanimously by the newly democratically elected 
parliament, most importantly gave amnesty to political prisoners and Basque and Catalan 
nationalists who had suffered oppression during the regime. But just as importantly, the law gave 
perpetrators of the dictatorship’s crimes amnesty against persecution (Aguilar Fernández 1997). 
Therefore, it effectively ended the idea of having any Transitional Justice measures implemented 
in post-Franco Spain before the process even began. 
Politics of the past would still continue to play an important role in democratic 
consolidation, though. Many Spanish politicians of the time negotiated with the spirit of reaching 
consensual democracy above all else. This is why the first democratic elections of 1977 were so 
important: their success legitimized the new democracy and disproved the Francoist myth of ‘an 
unfit Iberian character’ once and for all. Moreover, the Constitution of 1978 was passed in 
December with near unanimous approval by Spanish voters, giving an extra boost of legitimacy 
to the nascent democracy. Despite the general support for democratic consolidation, Humbelaek 
called this Constitution “a precise embodiment of the informal agreement not to instrumentalize 
the past for political gain.” And as the theories I presented expect, when the past is not 
appropriately dealt with in a society, there are inevitably going to be irruptions of memory that 
put it back on the political agenda. This leads me to my next section, in which I resume the 
timeline of democratic transition in the 1980s by focusing on the positions of the two main 
political parties in relation to the agreement not to deal with the past. 
Eruptions/Irruptions of Historical Memory 
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At the dawn of Spanish democracy, a new political structure and a set of institutions had 
to be rebuilt. The left-wing political parties emerged from the shadows after years of clandestine 
activity under Franco. These parties included PSOE, PCE (Partido Comunista de España) as 
well as Basque and Catalan nationalist parties. The right-wing parties had to reinvent themselves 
as anti-dictatorship, despite the fact that many elites from the party had trickled down from the 
Falangist party. The more conservative, traditional PP party was formed out of the Popular 
Alliance (Alianza Popular) and the Democratic Center Union party (Unión de Centro 
Democrático) (Hanley 2006). Although the left and the right represented radically different 
attitudes towards the past, they each had certain things to gain from agreeing to an Amnesty Law 
and to a general pact of silence/forgetting. “The right obtained legal amnesty in exchange for 
relinquishing their monopoly on power, while the left gained longed-for democratic rights in 
exchange for extending the amnesty to include infringements committed by Francoists during the 
dictatorship” (Humlebaek 2011: 78).  
However, starting in 1979 an explosive growth in the number of legislative initiatives 
relating to the authoritarian past were passed. Among these legal initiatives that sought 
reparations for the regime’s victims were pensions for the widows of Republican soldiers. On the 
local level, municipalities began to exhume Civil War era mass graves in order to give the 
remains proper reburials. The first case of its kind took place in Torremejía, Extremadura and the 
funeral service was attended by nearly 1000 people in the village. This ceremony marked a 
paradigm shift in Spanish society known as the first stage in the “recuperation of historical 
memory” (Humlebaek 2011: 80). Although this shift did not receive much media attention nor 
outright support from the left, digging up graves certainly did upset the right-wing parties. 
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These ‘openings’ towards dealing with the past were rejected in the attempted military 
coup led by Civil Guard lieutenant Antonio Tejero on February 23rd, 1981 (Humlebaek 2011: 
80). Not only was the public exposed to a reactivation of fear of military repression, but the 
social movement that was well underway which sought to recuperate historical memory was 
interrupted. All in all, the failed putsch of 1981 marked a doubling down on the agreement to 
forget because politicians on both sides of the aisle saw what military intervention in politics 
could do and were afraid of the past repeating (Humlebaek 2011). In the end, the 1980s saw the 
least amount of legislation passed regarding the authoritarian past despite the center left’s grip on 
power. 
PSOE did not instrumentalize the past for political gain until its power was threatened in 
the 1993 elections. In this case, PSOE felt threatened by PP, so they argued that PP’s Francoist 
past would be harmful to democracy if they were to take power. This marked the first time that 
the pact of silence was broken and utilized to win an election (which they eventually did). The 
year 2000 initiated the second wave of legislation focused on the authoritarian past. In November 
2002, the PP and all other political parties signed a common declaration condemning the war and 
the dictatorship. Then, in 2004, a series of reparation laws and measures were enacted under 
President José Luís Rodríguez Zapatero. Zapatero was the first head of government belonging to 
the ‘generation of the grandchildren’ — or the generation who lived neither during the war nor 
during the dictatorship, and were therefore never socialized by either experience (Humlebaek 
2011: 84). He did, however, come from a family that suffered losses in the civil war. 
The most emblematic piece of legislature passed under the Zapatero government was the 
Historical Memory Law, passed on October 31st, 2007. The law “recognizes and broadens the 
rights and establishes measures in favor of those who suffered persecution or violence during the 
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Civil War and the Franco dictatorship. Moreover, it principally recognizes the victims on both 
sides of the civil war, gives rights to the victims and the descendants of victims of the Civil War 
and the subsequent dictatorship of Franco, and formally condemns the Franco Regime” (Ley 
52/2007 de 26 de Diciembre). Francoist symbols were removed from public buildings and spaces 
and, of central importance my analysis in this thesis, political events were banned from taking 
place at the Valley of the Fallen (Boletín Oficial del Estado 2007). 
In essence, it wasn’t until the implementation of this law that the Spanish state began to 
formally introduce Transitional Justice measures, over 30 years after the death of the regime’s 
leader. This piece of legislation and the political sentiment that surrounds it on both sides of the 
aisle is crucial to understanding what came next in Spanish society. This is particularly true in 
the case of the Valley of the Fallen. Zapatero’s government set the foundational stage for the 
PSOE government of Pedro Sánchez today through making demands for Transitional Justice part 
of the party’s agenda. These goals were concretized in the Historical Memory Law, so when the 
Sánchez government took power in June 2017, he picked up where Zapatero left off. This 
continuation of the narrative that socialist governments would demand for justice at the Valley of 
the Fallen eventually led to the exhumation of Franco’s mortal remains in October 2019. 
This section on the transition period in Spain has led to what I argue is the greatest 
irruption of historical memory in contemporary Spanish society: the controversy of the Valley of 
the Fallen and the eventual exhumation of the mortal remains of Franco. In the following section, 
I briefly review the history of the Valley. Then, I analyze the political discourse that surrounded 
the monument from its inception in the 1950s until Franco’s exhumation in October 2019. I 
conclude by considering how it has shaped on the quality of Spanish democracy. 
El Valle de los Caídos 
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The Valley of the Fallen sits in the Cuelgamuros Valley, in the Sierra Guadarrama some 
54 kilometers to the northwest of Madrid. The most prominent piece of the monument, which 
was built over twenty years and officially opened to the public in 1959, is an enormous cross 
which towers 300 feet over the basilica below. The cross is the first thing that visitors see upon 
their arrival, beginning their ascent to the basilica that holds Franco’s remains. Due to its unique 
setting in the mountains, this gargantuan cross can be seen from many miles away. This was a 
very deliberate act that was typical of Franco’s conservatism at the time when he commissioned 
the construction of this monument. 
“This was a towering monument to Franco’s sense of his place in history. Not only did 
Franco doubtless hope that this vast temple to himself would compensate for his physical 
and sexual shortcomings and gain him immortality, but it remained a looming and 
permanent reminder to the Republicans that they had been defeated and destroyed by 
nothing short of a demigod” (Stockey 2013: 48).  
Visitors to the Valley can ascend to the top on foot through a steep mountain climb along a path 
which is dotted with many symbolic images and crosses that were meant as a reminder of the 
religious nature of the site. The visitor is therefore essentially forced onto a pilgrimage to the top, 
and through this physical exertion, the visitor who walks along this path not only recalls the 
suffering of Jesus, but also offers a penance to mark Christ’s sacrifice on their behalf (Stockey 
2013: 45). This is the first implicit connection of Catholicism to the regime which erected the 
monument and the way in which Franco had imagined visitors should arrive to the Valley. 
Every single detail at the Valley was deliberately and carefully planned by Franco 
himself. He even commissioned the construction of the tomb that he would one day occupy — 
and be exhumed from. Once visitors reach the top, they arrive at an esplanade and face the 
entrance into the basilica. The Francoist coat of arms has been chiseled onto the walls of the 
entrance to the basilica, above two flights of ten stairs (this repetition of ten was meant to 
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represent the Christian Ten Commandments). The coat of arms is the traditional insignia of 
Spanish fascism is the most outward example of political symbolism, and was not removed or 
altered even after the Spanish transition to democracy in 1975. 
 In order to understand the controversies that have followed, it is indispensable to know 
who built the monument in the Valley and who is buried there. The Franco regime used forced 
labor from the defeated Republican forces of the Spanish Civil War over a period of almost 
twenty years. This forced labor was part of Franco’s campaign to completely stamp out and 
punish the enemy. This victors vs. vanquished metaphor was crucial to understanding the 
cultural universe in which the Valley was built. It is in this context in which Silent Sam in 
Chapel Hill and the Valley of the Fallen differ greatly. Most of the monuments to the war dead in 
Spain were erected immediately after the war under the direction of the regime or local political 
elites, but also at the behest of local groups and individuals (Stockey 2013: 31).  
These monuments were also deliberately used to divide society and remind the 
vanquished who was in charge. If they were not doing forced labor on the Valley, the former 
Republican supporters were in prison camps, forced into prostitution, or exiled from the country 
entirely. “The rhetoric of the civil war as a heroic crusade against the forces of ‘anti-Spain’ — 
fashioned in the rebel zone from the start of the civil war — became institutionalized and 
ubiquitous under the Franco regime after 1939” (Stockey 2013: 55). The motivations behind the 
construction of the Valley of the Fallen were clear in that Franco meant to remind Spaniards for 
generations to come who won the war and who gained power after. I argue that this deliberate 
and divisive act supports the socialist party’s call for its removal today. 
 In the last part of this section, I argue that the name of the monument itself is of great 
interest to observers in the present day. The ‘fallen’ can be loosely understood as a reference to 
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those who died in the war. This message of ‘reconciliation’ of both sides after the Spanish Civil 
War was what Franco wanted to convey to the international world, and he succeeded to a certain 
extent. Though Franco-era Spain was a very closed country until the 1960s, the Valley of the 
Fallen had a number of high-profile visitors such as American President Richard Nixon and West 
German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer. Radio Vatican even reported the day of the inauguration 
that the site “is not a classic unilateral monument to the victors” but instead is a tribute to all who 
fell in the Spanish Civil War (Stockey 2013:75). 
The name of the monument also raises another interesting point: who are the fallen? 
Thousands of people — Republican and Nationalists alike — are buried at the Valley of the 
Fallen. Only two graves, however, are named. These belong to Franco, who was buried there in 
1975, and José Antonio Primo de Rivera, who has been buried in the Valley since its foundation. 
Primo de Rivera, the founder of the Falange party, was revered during the war by the Nationalist 
faction and regarded as a martyr after he was killed by Republican forces in Alicante in 1936. 
The fact that the ‘fallen’ Republican soldiers are also buried in the Valley is widely used as an 
argument by the right-wing parties today that the monument represents a post-war reconciliation 
effort and therefore should not be altered or removed. Despite the fact that historians and social 
scientists have argued that this monument was divisive, the official narrative of the Spanish state 
has remained that it was created for all. 
Analysis of Political Discourse 
This overview of the Valley’s construction and cultural importance helps us understand 
the modern-day resurgence in political discourse regarding the monument. In this section, I 
situate the resurgence in the ‘Generation of Grandchildren’ in the 21st century as part of the final 
push that broke the informal pact of silence among Spanish politicians once and for all. I trace 
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the opening of public discourse surrounding the Valley which was triggered by the PSOE 
government takeover in the summer of 2017 (El País 2019). Then, I chronologically detail the 
steps towards the October 24th exhumation, and I analyze the surrounding political discourse in 
order to make an argument regarding politicians’ views on Spanish democracy as a whole. 
The idea of exhuming Franco’s mortal remains from the Valley of the Fallen came from a 
proposed initiative to “develop the law of historical memory from the socialist government of 
José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero” passed on May 17th, 2017 with support of PSOE, Podemos and 
Ciudadanos parties. The PP and Catalan nationalist party voted against the measure. On June 
18th, 2018, Sánchez made an official statement to the Spanish public declaring his government’s 
firm plans to exhume the remains of dictator Franco: “The wounds have been open for many 
years, too many, and the time has arrived to close them. Our democracy will have symbols that 
unify the population” (El País June 2018). Sánchez’s wording implies that the Valley was 
actually a symbol that divided the Spanish population, contradicting the Franco-era message of 
the monument as a ‘reconciliation’ between the two sides of the civil war. By saying that the 




Figure 2: January 2020 Party Representation in Congress. Source: eldiario.es 
 
Politicians from the other side of the aisle had contradictory opinions. The speaker of PP 
Rafael Hernando accused Sánchez right away of questioning the constitutional pact of 1978 (El 
País 2018). He is referring to the informal pact of not instrumentalizing the past for political gain 
that I describe in Chapter 1. Pablo Casado, also of PP, echoed the same hard stance against 
exhumation and called the statement ‘incendiary’ and ‘fracturing to Spanish society’. The PP 
calling the proposed exhumation a ‘violation’ of this informal pact — which I argue was already 
broken in 2004 — supports my argument that the Spanish conservatives would rather continue to 
ignore the past and reap the benefits their party inherited from the Francoist past than to deal 
with it and move forward. In their eyes, the exhumation is no more than a political move by their 
opponents, and it does not make Spanish democracy better. 
After an amendment to the Law of Historical Memory and back and forth debates with 
the Franco family regarding the details of reburial, the exhumation was pushed through Congress 
and eventually approved in September 2019. I turn now to statements from prominent politicians 
regarding the exhumation and link their comments to effects on democracy. Sanchez made a 
speech on October 24th in which he said that the exhumation of the late dictator “ends a moral 
affront: the exaltation of a dictator in a public place … one more step towards reconciliation has 
been taken by Spanish society.” Moreover, Sánchez said that the Valley “was more than 
anachronistic and anomalous: it was an affront to Spanish democracy” and that “today’s Spain is 
the result of forgiveness, but it cannot be the result of forgetting,” (El País 2019). This is a clear 
reference to the pact of forgetting that was implemented during the transition process, which 
Sánchez has been highly critical of. 
 35 
It is clear that the discourse on the left wing viewed the Valley as harmful to democracy 
on a holistic level. But right-wing politicians use broad themes such as focusing on the present 
instead of resurfacing the past to argue for the strengthening of the current system. The statement 
“let’s not reopen the wounds of the past” is repeated often. For example, take the statement by 
PP party leader Casado: “We have to look to the future. I would like to talk about the Spain of 
my children and not the Spain of my grandparents. The transition [to democracy] was exemplary 
and there is nothing to rewrite” (El País 2019).  
Far-right wing party VOX claims to be the only political party to have vehemently 
opposed the exhumation. “And so the socialist campaign starts: desecrate tombs, exhuming 
hatreds, questioning the legitimacy of the monarchy. Only VOX will oppose head-on, because 
only VOX has the courage to defend liberty and common sense in the face of totalitarianism and 
the tricks of electoral propaganda” (@Santi_ABASCAL 24/09/19 Twitter). Rocío Monasterio, 
president of the VOX party in Madrid, echoed these remarks using accusatory and inflammatory 
language. 
“Moreover, we believe that this [exhumation] has been used in a partisan way to divide 
Spaniards, and Spaniards had done an incredible job of scarring up wounds, of leaving 
behind themes of the past, of trying to unite ourselves, and some politicians and other 
responsible people are dedicated to opening these mass graves that separate all of us and 
what they are really accomplishing is that the debate goes to the streets and that a lot of 
people who had closed these hurtful memories from a time in which both sides had a bad 
time, now they have to face those memories again and many people, especially many old 
people who lived through it and had a bad experience, will be hurt again. I think that this 
exercise is a huge irresponsibility” (La Sexta 2018). 
 
What does this mean for the far-right views on democracy? In these quotes, the belief that 
the past has passed and therefore should not be resurfaced or reproduced is evident. A clear view 
that the Spanish transition to democracy was a “job well done” can be observed. Additionally, 
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VOX spokespeople attack the PSOE government in power and accuse them of ‘dividing’ and 
‘hurting’ Spaniards. In performing a discourse analysis on these short speeches, I observe the far-
right wing trying to challenge history to gain sympathy for the ‘fallen’ on the Francoist side. 
Moreover, by calling PSOE and Sánchez a totalitarian propaganda machine, Abascal tries to 
reframe the conflict with PSOE as the oppressors of freedom and liberty. Through using this 
discursive practice and attempting to rewrite the narrative, Abascal demonstrates a malleable 
definition of liberal democracy, one which he can manipulate and use to his advantage. 
 
Figure 3: Spaniards’ Opinions on the Exhumations. Source: El Periódico 
 
In sum, we can observe that support for the Valley of the Fallen fell along partisan lines. 
The left-wing PSOE party not only supported the measure most vocally, but also demanded 
exhumation in the first place. Center-left party Ciudadanos and far-left Podemos also supported 
the measure. On the other side of the aisle, the traditional center right Popular Party opposed the 
exhumation wholeheartedly. No one was more vocal of his opposition, however, than Santiago 
Abascal and his far-right party VOX. Interestingly enough though, the Republican Left of 
Catalunya (ERC) party originally voted against the exhumation measure in 2017. A year later, 
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ERC speaker Joan Tardà demanded that the measure include more support for Franco’s victims 
in exchange for his party’s vote. Tardà criticized PSOE’s efforts in the past as being futile and 
having created “a cloud of absolute amnesia” (RTVE 2018). On this issue, the ERC wanted 
leading PSOE party to go even further left on the measure. What do these results mean for 
Spanish democracy? I argue that this partisan competition and debate among parties is healthy 
for Spanish democracy overall. The most worrisome response comes from far-right VOX party.  
I believe the party’s calls to ‘Make Spain Great Again’ and return to the past times are gaining 
























In the previous section, I have argued that the ‘irruption of memory’ in the case of the 
Valley of the Fallen was directly linked to the Spanish style of pacted transition to democracy. 
The transition was characterized by a pact of forgetting and based on the existing institutions and 
negotiated by elites from the former regime. The Portuguese transition, sparked by the Carnation 
Revolution on April 25th, 1974, could not have been any more different. Highly charged with a 
revolutionary spirit and grassroots celebrations, this transition was marked by a radical break 
with the past. The Carnation Revolution was triggered by a military coup on the streets of Lisbon 
featuring classic revolutionary characteristics. An anti-fascist, anti-capitalist wrath consumed the 
population, which resulted in a transition by complete systemic rupture. A grassroots movement 
led by the people forced thousands of right wingers into social exile, and many were even forced 
to leave the country in what were coined ‘wildcat purges’ (Pinto 21). These purges, as I will go 
into further detail about in this chapter, were of both legal and ‘wild’ nature. Their ‘wild’ nature 
sometimes got out of control, however, as they were clearly not without controversy (Pinto 22). 
The military aspect and power of the Movimento das Forças Armadas (MFA) makes the 
Portuguese case different from the Spanish case. But a double legacy of dictatorship and colonial 
wars affects the transition in ways that are not as simple as they appear, and in fact, the years 
directly following the April 25th revolution were riddled with uncertainty. 
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 In this chapter, I give a brief overview of the Carnation Revolution and the underlying 
forces leading up to the fall of the Estado Novo in Portugal. Then I illustrate the type of 
transition and explain the most important characteristics of this process, highlighting the key 
Transitional Justice measures that were implemented such as truth committees, amnesty trials, 
and legal and ‘wild’ purges. I compare the Portuguese transition to democracy to that of Spain in 
order to support my argument that the Portuguese transition was more effective in preventing an 
enduring authoritarian legacy. I cannot make this argument without noting that the years directly 
after the revolution were tumultuous and democracy was uncertain. The end of the colonial wars 
in Africa and the fact that the military led the revolution, and therefore intervened in politics, 
complicated the transition greatly. I conclude this chapter with a discussion of how the politics of 
the past eventually disappeared from public discourse. 
The Carnation Revolution 
 When Paulo de Carvalho’s 1974 Eurovision Contest song “E Depois do Adeus” began to 
play on Radio Renascença at 10:50 p.m., it triggered a revolution. Several young MFA officers 
heard this secret code signal and took to the streets (Pinto 2006). After a few hours, Marcello 
Caetano — the successor to Salazar after his death in 1968 — and his government were ousted. 
Despite repeated appeals from the MFA captains advising the people to stay home, thousands of 
Portuguese took to the streets and supported the military insurgents. Several of the insurgents put 
carnations in their gun barrels, which created the image broadcast on television worldwide and 
gave the revolution its name. Although no mass demonstrations preceded the coup, many 
tensions and underlying demands for peace — especially in the Colonial Wars in Angola, 
Mozambique and Guinea Bissau — led up to this moment (Raimundo 2015: 10). 
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 Despite the overwhelming joy felt in those first few revolutionary days, uncertainty 
plagued the process of democratic consolidation. This period of disputes between the new leftist 
parties and the MFA leaders was called the Processo Revolucionário Em Curso (PREC) and 
lasted until the first democratic elections in 1975 (Raimundo 2015: 9). In fact, some scholars 
have called this period a state crisis because the MFA forces, who had the people’s support, 
would not cede power to the political parties. One of the most powerful forces during transition 
was the intervention of the military into politics, and therefore the role that those actors played in 
Portuguese democratic consolidation. 
 These forces in the political sphere also affected the types of Transitional Justice doled 
out to the former authoritarian elites in the transition years. This type of post-coup TJ affected 
the institutions, the elite, collaborators and civil servants and even extended to the private sector 
(Pinto 2006). Many of the punitive measures taken against the most infamous Estado Novo 
collaborators were based on ‘revolutionary legitimacy’ and therefore exist outside of democratic 
institutions such as a judiciary (Pinto 2017: 56). These measures included the criminalization and 
denunciation of the authoritarian apparatus (especially the political police), the dissolution of all 
respective institutions, legal purges as well as ‘wildcat’ purges and even the dismissal of 
managers in private firms. The last two measures are in response to the powerful anti-capitalist 
wave that can be observed in various left-wing and extreme left segments of the population 
during this time (Pinto 2017: 56). 
Legal and ‘Wildcat’ Purges 
 The figure below illustrates the number of individuals expelled or suspended from the 
public sector, either from purge committees or in a ‘wildcat’ manner until December 1974. The 
largest sector purged was from Education and Culture with 1029 purges. In an interview with 
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Antonio Costa Pinto in Lisbon in January 2020, he told the story of a professor from the Catholic 
University of Lisbon who was physically barred from entering the classroom in the summer 1974 
because of his right-wing political views and ties to the regime.1 
 
Figure 4: Number of individuals removed or suspended from public office, whether it be 
through a truth committee or in a ‘wildcat’ manner (until December 1974). Source: Pinto 
2008 
 
 Many purges also took place on the economic level, illustrating strong ties between the 
economic elite and the regime and the anti-capitalist forces that desired to eliminate them. The 
wildcat purges were concentrated mainly around the industrial areas of Lisbon and the recently 
nationalized banking and insurance sectors. The processes of nationalization, state intervention, 
land occupation and agrarian reform also had very significant impacts on Portuguese social and 
economic elite. These impacts would affect Portuguese economic development and democratic 
consolidation in the following years (Pinto 2017: 63).  
 
1 I conducted this interview with Dr. Antonio Costa Pinto in person at the University of Lisbon Social Sciences 
building on January 24, 2020.  
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It’s important to mention at this time that for many historians and social scientists, the 
idea of a ‘purge’ is still problematic. Purges are unfair at times and can hinder rather than help 
the country move forward into democracy. I argue that while the ‘wildcat’ purges in Portugal 
were effective at ridding the Portuguese political system of Salazar supporters, the violence was 
sometimes counterproductive. In fact, the removal of public officials was not legalized until July 
1975 when the Constitutional Law 8/75 provided for judicial trials of the political police and 
government officials directly responsible for repression (Pinto 2006: 43). 
This threat of violence was particularly frightening due to the military’s position of 
power and interjections into politics. That is why the two years after the Carnation Revolution 
were highly tumultuous and no one was exactly sure if these efforts would result in a 
consolidated democracy (Bermeo 2007). In order to further problematize these purges, I cast a 
wider net and explore the ideas of other scholars in the field. As Russian history expert Zbigniew 
Brzezinski noted in his 1958 article “The Pattern of Political Purges,” a purge is an inherent 
characteristic of a totalitarian regime and the term is still highly linked to Joseph Stalin’s Great 
Purges in the 1950s (Brzezinski 1958). The term therefore still holds a great deal of negative 
connotations and allusions to violence. 
How do transitional democracies deal with officials who have involvement in the prior 
regime? Should they be excluded and exiled, or should they be incorporated into the new 
democracy? Roman David tries to answer this question in his 2011 book, Lustration and 
Transitional Justice: Personnel systems in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. David does 
this by examining major institutional innovations that developed in Central Europe following the 
collapse of communist regimes (David 2011: 2). Though the geographical location falls outside 
the scope of this paper, there are some very interesting lessons to be learned from David’s work. 
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The essence of the arguments lays in the need to answer this puzzle: How do transitional policies 
— as well as their absence — negatively impact democratization? The result, he argues, very 
well could be an incomplete democracy. Even if these policies designed to deal with personnel 
inherited from previous regimes have been instituted, such as in Portugal, problems can arise. 
“The policies of wholesale dismissal, if implemented, are very problematic in terms of their 
constitution to successful political transformation. They may inhibit rather than facilitate 
democratization (David 2011: 3). By simply purging anyone who was involved in the former 
regime, those people do not get the chance to redemocratize themselves and perhaps even form 
new political identities. This paradox, therefore, is the key problem with these large-scale wild 
purges that happened in Portugal in the transition years. 
In 1975, a group of extreme left-wingers of the MFA attempted to perform another 
military coup in order to institute a communist government. This attempt on the first 
democratically elected government failed, and a counter coup took place to neutralize the radical 
left-wing military. A new settlement between political parties and the military was created and 
called the Second Pact (Pinto 2017: 63). After this threat, political parties began to cooperate 
more with a common goal: “forming an implicit democratic coalition with the aim of 
establishing a liberal democracy” (Jalali 2007: 76). Though this political pact at first glance 
looks like the Spanish one, it is important to remember that there was no agreed upon element of 
forgetting the past for the sake of democracy in Portugal. In the end, Portugal became another 
example of the dominant process of democratic consolidation in Southern Europe: 
“consolidation through parties” (Morlino 1998: 249). The Partido Socialista (PS), Partido Social 
Demócrata (PSD) and Centro Democrâtico e Social — Partido Popular (CDS) cooperated for the 
sake of democratic consolidation in the years to come.  
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The purges soon ended and were even reevaluated as perhaps an overstep of the early 
transitional period according to Portuguese scholars such as Antonio Costa Pinto, Filipa 
Raimundo and Pedro Magalhães. The late 1970s and early 1980s therefore marked a shift in the 
transition period, one which prioritized democratic coalitions with the aim of establishing a 
liberal democracy just like in the Spanish case. It is at this critical historical juncture when 
Raimundo argues that the past stopped constituting a relevant matter. She argues that this is 
because starting in the 1980s, the political elite started to prepare for the European integration 
process and, due to the disappearance of the far-right forces in politics, politicizing the past 
became irrelevant. 
Costa argues that the variety of transition in Portugal must be correlated with the absence 
of the veto capacity of former authoritarian elites and institutions caused by their collapse. 
Mainly, a correlation can also be observed between the variety of transition and with the process 
of state crisis and military intervention in politics after the fall of the regime (Costa 2017: 69). It 
is important to recognize the legacy of the new political cleavages that emerged in the 
‘revolutionary juncture’ of 1975 where therefore the consolidation of democracy was much more 
concerned with coping with the legacies of transition and much less concerned with the previous 
authoritarian regime.  A clear line can be drawn at this crucial juncture between the past and the 
politicization of it. This link supports my argument that the legacy of Salazar and the Estado 
Novo has less importance in modern day Portugal and therefore not as many cases of ‘irruptions’ 
of historical memory can be found. 
The Case of Museu Salazar 
I set out to find a comparable case in Portugal to the Valley of the Fallen in Spain in 
order to support my argument that a strong authoritarian legacy is not observed as outwardly in 
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modern day Portugal thanks to the successful TJ measures implemented in the 1970s. These 
include trials, truth committees and truth documents as well as amnesty laws. The idea of a 
Museum to Salazar has been floated around for a few years by the mayor of the town where 
Salazar was born. This hypothetical museum is a worthy case to study in comparison to the 
Valley of the Fallen due to its similar exalting nature of the dictator. In this section, I give an 
overview of the proposed museum and trace the timeline of the first announcement of the idea in 
2016 until the current situation today. Then I perform a discourse analysis on the various quotes 
and stances taken by politicians across different parties in order to make an observation on how 
the legacy of authoritarians can shape domestic politics years later. I argue that a very similar 
rhetoric along party lines actually took place in Portugal when the parliament took up the 
measure and ruled that the museum would not be built. 
 The idea to have a Museu Salazar in the deceased dictator’s birthplace of Vimeiro was 
first mentioned in a survey conducted in 2016 by a group of social scientists at the University of 
Lisbon. The survey titled “Memória da Oposição e Resistência ao Estado Novo” sought to find 
out what the victims of the regime — mostly men around the age of 70 — thought in light of the 
90-year anniversary of the May 1926 military coup through which the dictatorial regime was 
installed (Público 2016). The survey had several interesting findings. First, in response to a 
Museu Salazar, 51 percent of the 131 people surveyed said that this museum should not be 
permitted. Twenty-three percent were in favor, and 26 percent gave no opinion (Público 2016). 
But in regards to the renaming of the Ponte Salazar to the Ponte 25 Abril, 85 percent surveyed 
agreed that this was a positive thing and only 5 percent disagreed.  
Filipa Raimundo, the head of this study and a key figure in the Portuguese 
democratization field, also came to the conclusion that there is a notable difference between the 
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evaluation of the authoritarian regime amongst the ex-members of the resistance and of the 
general population. Ninety-four percent of the victims of the Estado Novo surveyed said that the 
regime had more negative things than positive things whereas only 47 percent of the general 
population agreed with this statement. Another interesting question that this survey posed was in 
relation to the effectiveness of post-1974 Transitional Justice measures. Raimundo found that 72 
percent of those surveyed consider that the victims still haven’t obtained the recognition they 
deserve. Moreover, 95 percent of victims of the regime surveyed agreed that in democracy the 
perpetrators of the dictatorship were not ‘dealt with enough justice’ and 65 percent of the general 
population shared that opinion (Público 2016). “Those who were victims of repression and who 
directly suffered the consequences of political/ideological persecution clearly considered the 
measures adopted to punish those responsible for the repression to be insufficient,” (Raimundo 
2016). 
The case of the Museu Salazar was largely left to rest after the publication of this 
damning survey. But in July 2019, the mayor of Santa Comba Dão Leonel Gouveia declared his 
intent to construct and open a museum dedicated to his town’s most infamous resident by the end 
of the summer. He said, “This will be a place for the study of the history of the Estado Novo. It 
won’t be a sanctuary for nationalists nor a museum where the statesman of Santa Comba Dão 
will be demonized” (Expresso 2019). Gouveia, elected from the Socialist Party, did not initially 
reveal the ‘scientific direction’ or responsible actors for the project. The only detail announced 
was that the museum would be built in the former Escola-Cantina Salazar, next to the old house 
of the president of the Council of Ministers (Expresso 2019). 
There were several interesting responses and immediate critiques to Mayor Gouveia’s 
proposal. The first came from historian Fernando Rosas, a historian with expertise on the Estado 
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Novo. He told the Expresso newspaper that Gouveia contacted him about the subject but that he 
rejected any type of collaboration with that ‘pseudo interpretive center’ which he considers to be 
‘a mere decoy of political tourism’ despite possible well intentions (Público 2019). Hundreds of 
other historians, economists, social scientists and even politicians agree with Rosas. 
In August 2019, a petition called ‘Museu Salazar, NÃO!’ was published and collected 
nearly 5000 signatures in the first 48 hours (Expresso 2019). The open letter addressed to Prime 
Minister António Costa demanded that he block the creation and development of this planned 
museum. The petition, supported by 204 ex-political prisoners, was delivered to the President of 
the Republic as well as the Prime Minister on August 14, 2019 (Expresso 2019). The petition 
argues that the museum claims to “clarify and explain the fascist regime to the younger 
generations,” but in actuality, “its creation would be overshadowed as an instrument in service of 
white-washing the past and serve as a center of pilgrimage for the Salazarists of the regime 
toppled on April 25” (Expresso 2019). 
After this petition was signed by thousands of Portuguese in the following months, this 
expression of opposition was open to the public. A particularly hard stance from the Portuguese 
of African descent suggests a double legacy of authoritarianism and war in some of the former 
colonies such as Angola, Mozambique, Cabo Verde, Guinea Bissau and Timor Leste. Joaquim 
Cavalho was interviewed by Deutsche Welle Portugal and told his story about being arrested in 
Angola under the regime for merely speaking aloud about his country’s history ‘in a nationalist 
way’ (DW 2019). He argued that creating a museum glorifying a ‘dangerous figure’ would be 
harmful to everyone who suffered under his dictatorship — in Portugal and in Africa. “It would 
be dangerous for anyone to get a romanticized image of a dictator who was responsible for the 
imprisonment and death of many Portuguese and Africans alike” (DW 2019). 
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 The summer of debate and public outrage was put to a stop when the national parliament 
voted on the measure on September 11, 2019. With the votes of PS, BE, PCP and PEV and the 
abstentions from the PSD and the CDS, Parliament ruled that the construction of a Centro de 
Interpretação do Estado Novo is “an affront to democracy, to the values consecrated into the 
Constitution of the Republic and an offense to the memory of the victims of the dictatorship” 
(Diario de Noticias 2019). Since this parliamentary decision, construction and development on 
the museum has halted.  
In the following section, I further examine the discourse and reactions surrounding this 
decision by various politicians of the left, right and center. I also try to establish a linkage 
connecting authoritarian legacies and politics of the past to the theme of the ‘quality’ of 
democracy. I argue that the implementation of TJ measures (the creation of truth commissions, 
reparations for the victims, etc.) that took place in the direct aftermath of the Carnation 
Revolution have softened the blow when it comes to ‘irruptions’ of historical memory, but 
clearly, they still happen and I try to find out why. 
Legislative Discourse Analysis 
In this section which marks the end of my chapter on Portugal, I use the theories 
presented in previous sections and knowledge presented about the Portuguese transition to 
democracy to examine the unique nature of the case of the Museu Salazar and Parliament’s 
decision to vote on a measure that does not even exist. I start by presenting a series of statements 
from various political parties reacting to the Parliament’s condemning decision against the 
creation of such a museum. I examine the statements from various political parties such as the 
Socialist Party (PS), Left Bloc (BE), Portuguese Communist Party (PCP), The Greens (PEV) and 
the two parties which abstained: The Social Democratic Party (PSD) and People’s Party (CDS). I 
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seek to answer why these last two parties abstained from the vote, as well as illuminating how 
the resurgence of this topic has affected Portuguese democracy. 
  The motion “Of the creation of a ‘museum’ dedicated to Salazar in Santa Comba Dão” 
was brought to the floor on September 10, 2019 by the PCP. Voto de condenação n. º 876/XIII-4ª 
was approved after one day of debate on September 11 (Parlamento Português 2019). The 
motion describes the ‘interpretive center’ as devoid of the full historical denouncement of the 
oppressive nature of the dictatorship that repressed, tortured and assassinated the Portuguese 
population for over half a century (Parlamento Português 2019). This statement suggests that to 
be on the ‘right side’ of history, one has to completely condemn the dictatorship and its crimes. 
Therefore, the Assembly of the Republic as the “sovereign body representing Portuguese 
democracy” is able to make these decisions regarding what harms the country’s democracy and 
how (Parlamento Português 2019).  
 If the creation of a museum to Salazar was declared historically baseless and condemned 
at a national level, then why did two political parties simply abstain entirely? The CDS-PP 
Parliamentary coalition explained in a motion on September 12, 2019 why members chose not to 
vote at all. “The CDS abstains from voting … with consideration that under no circumstance 
does [the center] consent to any type of Estado Novo idolatry, or from whichever dictatorship, 
also [we] don’t see the necessity for the prohibition of an interpretive center of the same” 
(Parlamento Português 2019). Interestingly enough, the CDS representatives went on to say that 
the vote was a long-term attempt to “stir up ghosts” and that if anyone “has a history of accession 
and defense of totalitarian concessions, it is precisely the PCP” (Parlamento Português 2019). 
Let’s unpack this last statement. The notion of “stirring up ghosts” is reminiscent of many 
statements made by right-wing parties in Spain regarding the Valley of the Fallen who accuse the 
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left-wing of politicizing the past by reviving it. Moreover, by pointing fingers at the communist 
parties for their revolutionary past, the PCP is reviving and politicizing it themselves. This 
statement in Parliament shows that the Museu Salazar was an ‘irruption of memory’ in Portugal, 
showing that an authoritarian legacy does in fact still exist today. 
 In this chapter, I have traced the history of 20th century Portugal from the Salazar regime 
to the April 25th Carnation Revolution. Then I described the revolution and the transition years 
in order to compare and contrast the very different transitions to democracy in Portugal and 
neighboring Spain. I hypothesized that Portugal has a weaker authoritarian legacy today due to 
the implementation of various TJ measures such as truth committees, reparations and amnesties 
as well as wild purges, which sometimes cause more chaos than peace. I examined the proposed 
idea of a Museu Salazar in Santa Comba Dão in the summer of 2019 and the political discourse 
that surrounded the idea. Ultimately, the museum was prohibited by a parliamentary measure 
approved in September 2019. Although this idea has been stopped legislatively, that doesn’t 
mean that the political and public discourse does not exist or will not continue to exist. As shown 
by the sheer number of historians, professors and other members of civil society who spoke out 
against this museum, the legacy of authoritarianism lives on in the minds of the Portuguese 
population, as well as in its former colonial countries. By examining the statements made by the 
CDS and PSD parties, I found that not only is the legacy still present, but it can also be utilized 








CHAPTER 4: COMPARING QUALITIES OF IBERIAN DEMOCRACY  
 
In this final chapter, I tie the theories of authoritarian legacies, politics of the past and 
transitional justice to the quality of democracy in Spain and Portugal. First, I review the theories 
and offer a definition of the “qualities” that make a good democracy. Then I offer possible 
effects respective to each country’s case and examine the manifestations of legacies in politics 
today. I conclude with an argument on what can be learned from the Iberian case and where 
future research can continue these efforts in the future. 
 What is the linkage connecting authoritarian legacies, politics of the past and transitional 
justice to the theme of ‘quality’ of democracy? In order to answer this question, first we must 
offer a definition of ‘quality of democracy.’ Quality of democracy should be considered “a stable 
institutional set of institutions that realizes the liberty and equality of citizens through the 
legitimate and correct functioning of them” (Morlino 2017: 169). Some qualities are related both 
to the authoritarian legacy and the politics of the past, as well as the way each country deals with 
its own authoritarian legacy. In terms of democracy, a ‘good’ democracy is thus: “A broadly 
legitimated regime that completely satisfies citizens (quality in terms of result) and second, a 
good democracy is one in which the citizens, associations and communities of which it is 
composed at least enjoy a moderate level of liberty and equality; and third, in a good democracy 
it is the citizens who have the power to check and evaluate whether the government is pursuing 
the objectives of liberty and equality according to the rule of law” (Morlino 2017: 169). I use this 
definition of ‘qualities’ and of ‘good’ democracy as my analytical foundations for this section. 
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 Morlino argues that authoritarian legacies can constrain or impede the best expressions of 
democracy when a variety of factors are still present in the current society. These effects depend 
on three basic dimensions for strategic action: duration of the previous regime, institutional 
innovation (and/or endurance) of that regime, and the mode of transition from authoritarianism 
(Hite and Morlino 2004). In order to relate these questions to democratic quality, it is important 
to focus on how such legacies have affected the new democratic institutions as well as the modes 
of political incorporation (Morlino 2017: 170). To do this, we have to examine and analyze 
political parties, external party organizations as well as their relations and various interests. 
Depending on the nature of transition, a certain level of path dependency can be 
established early on by using pre-existing institutions from the regime. This is the case in Spain, 
for example. One of Morlino’s findings claims that a statist authoritarian tradition is largely 
present in the new democracies of Southern Europe. Statism is defined here as “the constant and 
continuous reference to public institutions, as well as to people’s expectations that the state 
initiates and is responsible for every aspect of their lives” (Morlino 2017: 177). A statist legacy, 
which has often been related to lengthy authoritarian regimes, can result in low political interest 
and participation in democracies. 
Another interesting finding presented here is that in both Spain and Portugal, memories 
of the military regimes evoke associations with a desire for order, efficiency, and predictability, 
often in the economic as well as the political arena. I argue that social triggers such as economic 
downturn can leave the population nostalgic for the order and efficiency that perhaps, in some 
ways, the authoritarian regime provided. For example, a survey conducted by the Institute for 
Social Science researchers at the University of Lisbon interviewed people on the 40-year 
anniversary of the Carnation Revolution. This survey found that “the economic crisis appears to 
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have had a destabilizing effect … the tendency to evaluate the Estado Novo positively 
increases,” said Pinto to Público in 2016 when these results were published. “Having a positive 
attitude towards the old regime could be a form of protest against the crisis, the government, the 
traditional political parties, the austerity measures and the national and international political 
institutions” (Público 2016). This finding is important for linking the authoritarian past and its 
legacies to a modern phenomenon affecting the whole continent, but particularly the southern 
European countries. 
And finally, there is observable structural violence that weighs heavily on the polity and 
society today. The history of a divided country under civil war and short spurts of democracy in 
the 20th century lead to uncertainty and little faith in the system overall. At times, preferences 
for stability and order over debate and dissent reflect a lingering fear of this polarization and the 
brutal state violence endured during the regime. For example, in Spain one can observe the pact 
of silence which created a sort of national collective amnesia when it came to discussing the 
violence of the civil war and the Franco era. Strong legacies in politics and society still appear 
here due to the repression on free speech which created a pressure cooker effect that only broke 
through after Franco’s death in 1975. 
Therefore, shared external factors such as the economic crisis have affected both 
countries and triggered eruptions of the past in different ways. They have also changed public 
opinion towards the regime in some cases as some sectors of the population become increasingly 
nostalgic for the sense of ‘order and efficiency’ that perhaps the regime offered. In the Spanish 
case, this desire for order and control has even manifested itself into a political movement: the 
VOX party. Certain cleavages of the population have been aggravated by economic recession as 
well as what they view as increasing migration, and have found this far-right populist party 
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reclaiming certain parts of Franco’s narrative as an acceptable outlet for their frustrations. Every 
election the party seems to gain more traction and win more and more seats. I argue that the 
increase in support for these nationalists is a strong example of reframing and taking advantage 
of the country’s past for political gain. 
There are also effects on the spirit of democracy on a holistic level. When the past is not 
appropriately dealt with, there can be irruptions of memory that put it back on the political 
agenda. These ‘irruptions’ can violate the spirit of democracy and the principles of freedom, 
equality and justice for all. “Democracies must find a delicate balance between adapting to 
political constraints and insisting on democratic and rule of law principles; but above all they 
must establish mechanisms to help prevent future human rights violations, because legacies of 
mass human rights violations constitute a problem that is extremely difficult to resolve in a 
democratic framework, and they have the capacity to destabilize a transition to democracy or — 
what may be worse — corrode the basic principles upon which democracy rests” (Barahona de 















In this thesis, I have argued that the quality of Iberian democracy today is shaped by the 
quality of Transitional Justice (TJ) that took place at the time of democratization. I hypothesized 
that the reason for this phenomenon was due to the varying types of TJ mechanisms used in both 
countries: legal purges, truth committees, victim reparations, reburials, or none at all. These 
mechanisms were a direct effect of the nature of regime change and the respective institutions 
that were built in the early years of democracy. I expected to find a weaker consolidated 
democracy in Spain than in Portugal due to the lack of TJ measures implemented right at the 
dawn of democracy in 1975. This was tied to the mode of transition in Spain, which was elite 
pacted rather than mobilized through revolution, as in Portugal. The Portuguese transition to 
democracy was sparked by a peaceful revolution, but the military involvement in politics and 
problematic ‘wild’ purges led to very turbulent years after April 25th, 1974.  
I began by examining the theories of authoritarian legacies, politics of the past and 
transitional justice to establish my theoretical framework. I chose to focus on Transitional Justice 
as the basis for my analysis. Using this theoretical framework, I zoomed in on two monuments in 
Spain and Portugal to examine the extent of authoritarian legacies in both countries. These 
monuments are the Valley of the Fallen in the mountains of Madrid and the potential Museu 
Salazar, which was proposed as an ode to former dictator Salazar in his hometown. I then 
performed a discourse analysis on the reactions from politicians across the spectrum, finding that 
in fact healthy partisan competition in Spain is good for democracy. In contrast, I expected to 
 56 
find a weaker authoritarian legacy left by Salazar but I found that a dual legacy of Salazar and 
the colonial wars in Africa certainly still exists. Moreover, in examining the discourse 
surrounding the proposed Museu Salazar, I found striking parallels to that of the Spanish case 
where the center-right parties warned of “stirring up the past.”  
While I originally argued that there was not as strong an effect in Portugal, I ultimately 
found through the discourse of the Museu Salazar that this is not entirely true. The nature of the 
‘wild’ purges led to uncertain revolutionary years and dual legacies of authoritarianism and 
military rule. By linking the various dimensions of authoritarian legacies such as duration, 
innovation and the mode of transition, I have shown how these effects linger in today’s societies. 
Since the Spanish case included a long period of silence covering up the wounds of the Spanish 
Civil War, I have argued that there were still many unresolved tensions that exploded onto the 
scene when Franco died in 1975. These tensions resulted in ‘irruptions of memory’ such as the 
Valley of the Fallen and resulting political controversy. 
It is clear through analyzing these monuments and the surrounding discourse that 
authoritarian legacies are still present in Spain and Portugal today, but to what extent? And to 
what extent do they directly impact the quality of democracy? In my final chapter, I linked the 
theories of politics of the past, authoritarian legacies, and transitional justice to the quality of 
democracy on the Iberian Peninsula. First I defined ‘qualities’ and then I used these theories to 
show how the modern-day democracies in Spain and Portugal have residual effects from their 
authoritarian past. These effects not only linger in the minds of the citizens, but they can also be 
observed in the institutions that society is based on today. There is certainly room for further 
research in the democratization field strengthening the ties between these theories and the quality 
of democracy today and exploring all of their future ramifications. 
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The most worrying threat in the Spanish case is that of far-right party VOX whose party 
leader’s extremist, vitriolic language may be pushing the center-right parties farther to the right. 
The growing support this populist party has received since the December 2018 elections in 
Andalusia is worrisome because it means that Abascal’s “Make Spain Great Again” rhetoric and 
allusions to the Franco era in a positive light is appealing to many Spaniards. This trend must be 
closely monitored if it is to be stopped. The fledgling populist party Chega in Portugal, who 
gained one seat in Portuguese Parliament in the October 2019 elections, must also be monitored 
for its nationalist and conservative rhetoric in the future (Público 2019). In light of modern-day 
challenges such as the economic crisis and the threat of the far-right, it is now time for Spanish 
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